http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20031124101509990006&_mpc=news%2e6

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

Rob

"robert arndt" > wrote in message
m...
>
http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20031124101509990006&_mpc=news%2e6
>
> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

There is still time.

Rummy is performance oriented and the 2001 procurement production break
changes everything.

"robert arndt" wrote
>
> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the
Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>
>

V-22 can still be axed.
But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
VL

"MLenoch" > wrote in message
...
> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >
> >
>
> V-22 can still be axed.
> But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?

Cut them up.

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 16:12:46 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> wrote:

>
>"MLenoch" > wrote in message
...
>> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> V-22 can still be axed.
>> But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
>
>Cut them up.
>


Yeah that would be a real smart move.

"Scott Ferrin" > wrote in message
...
> On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 16:12:46 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
> > wrote:
>
> >
> >"MLenoch" > wrote in message
> ...
> >> >> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >> >
> >> >
> >>
> >> V-22 can still be axed.
> >> But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
> >
> >Cut them up.

> Yeah that would be a real smart move.

Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "robert arndt" wrote
> >
> > Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>
> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the
> Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
> advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable. First,
why were those Apaches expereincing such difficulty during that one deep
mission? Bad terrain contributed to the problem (realatively flat and good
visibility), as did the decision *not* to fire the normal SEAD support
effort from the tubes and MLRS/ATACMS due to concern over potential civilian
casualties. Being a bit too aggressive also probably counted against them
that night (anybody who has ever participated in any DIV or Corps level
exercise where Apaches were included in the play knows how strenuously the
aviators tried to keep the Apaches in the deep fight and tried to eschew the
over-the-shoulder missions). Second, we have no UAV as yet, or in the near
term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do; none can match
its weapons load, nor its ability to carry a mix of weapons, nor carry
*both* a target acquisition and tracking radar *and* a good FLIR/thermal
sight, and current UAV's can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight in
short order when required.

Will the UAV's eventually be able to match those kind of capabilities? To
some extent (though the weapons load/mix will be tough unless you make one
big honking UAV), especially when the rotary UCAV becomes available...some
day. Look to see the Apache remain a viable part of the force mix for many
more years. The RAH-66 was cut because it had become a "black hole" for RD&A
funding, with continuing problems and an ever changing in-service date; it
was also too darned expensive on a per unit basis and the number last being
bandied about for procurement was too low to fill the original projected
need by far. If the attack helo concept was as dead as you portray it as
being, why is the USMC, which is usuallly the last service to waste precious
resources on outdated concepts, still moving at full speed with the AH-1Z
program?

Brooks

>
>
>

Kevin Brooks wrote:
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> . ..
>>
>> "robert arndt" wrote
>>>
>>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
>>
>> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
>> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
>> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
>> was last-war's weapon.
>
> Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

> we have no UAV as yet, or in the
> near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;

Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the RAH-66
could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll never
understand.)




--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

>Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.

We're certainly past that point. Today, the F-15s are literally falling apart
in the air and something is needed to replaced the old F-15C and soon-to-be
F-15E airframes. (Friends in the squadrons often tell tales of shedding tail
feathers, etc.) New production F-15s? Maybe? Or new production F-22s?
Whatever?
VL

All good points. Bad tactics in one engagement do not mean attack helicopters
are useless. And for all their hype, UAVs are nowhere near a true replacement.


The Army screwed up Comanche development by under-funding the effort and
dragging it out over 20 years. The aircraft itself performed, but the program
failed. This decision still leaves the Army without a replacement for the
OH-58D.

Frank

"MLenoch" > wrote in message
...
> >Not as smart as shutting down the F-22 in '98.
>
> We're certainly past that point. Today, the F-15s are literally falling
apart
> in the air and something is needed to replaced the old F-15C and
soon-to-be
> F-15E airframes. (Friends in the squadrons often tell tales of shedding
tail
> feathers, etc.) New production F-15s? Maybe? Or new production F-22s?

Gephard is retiring, so the super eagle is probably no longer viable.

The F-35 is going to have to pull part of the F-15's duty even if Lockheed
pulls of a miracale, as the 160 F-22 aircraft are not enough to replace the
F-15.

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote > >>
> >> "robert arndt" wrote
> >>>
> >>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >>
> >> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
> >> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
> >> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
> >> was last-war's weapon.
> >
> > Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.
>
> I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
> conclusion.
>
> What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
> getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
> didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
> MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
> to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
> certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
> sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
> radar signature reduction.
>
> If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
> because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important, carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

"Thomas Schoene" > wrote in message
ink.net...
> Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> > . ..
> >>
> >> "robert arndt" wrote
> >>>
> >>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> >>
> >> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
> >> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
> >> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
> >> was last-war's weapon.
> >
> > Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.
>
> I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
> conclusion.
>
> What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
> getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
> didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
> MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
> to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
> certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
> sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
> radar signature reduction.

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But be
careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF. About the best
you can do in that realm is to say that "Deep attack helo missions over open
terrain with good visibility afforded to the bad guys, and without the
benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own arty assets is extremely
risky." Not much beyond that.

>
> If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
> because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

I could generally agree with that, with the caveat that part of what was
wrong was a skyrocketing program and unit cost.

>
> > we have no UAV as yet, or in the
> > near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;
>
> Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the
RAH-66
> could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
> just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll
never
> understand.)

You have to understand the changes in the Army aviation missions over the
past few years. Dedicated attack helos were pulled from a number of units
(i.e., a portion of the divisional aviation battalions in airborne/air
assault divisions, cavalry units) some years back in favor of the AH-58D,
which was nothing more than the OH-58D with armament added. I did not like
Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom of including a strike capability in
your cavalry scout birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as
planned, the ability to engage time sensitive targets of opportunity during
the scout mission, and ensuring that your *cavalry* units can perform their
cavalry roles, to include both guard and (even) covering force battle
operations.

That said, I am quite happy to see the demise of this program, and only wish
it had happened earlier when the resultant savings could have been applied
to other critical needs.

Brooks

>
>
>
>
> --
> Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
> "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
> special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)
>
>
>
>

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..
>
> "Thomas Schoene" wrote
> > Kevin Brooks wrote:
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote > >>
> > >> "robert arndt" wrote
> > >>>
> > >>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.
> > >>
> > >> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
> > >> Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
> > >> the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
> > >> was last-war's weapon.
> > >
> > > Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.
> >
> > I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
> > conclusion.
> >
> > What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches
were
> > getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
> that
> > didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns
and
> IR
> > MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major
threats
> > to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
> > certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
> large
> > sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
> > radar signature reduction.
> >
> > If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
> > because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.
>
> Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
at
> low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
> Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
> alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
> worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
> attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
> weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
cue
> a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
> heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
> persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Brooks

>
>

>From: (MLenoch)
> >

>>> Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

>V-22 can still be axed.
>But, isn't the F-22 already 'deployed', at least at Tyndall?
>VL

Yes it is. I was down is Destin, FLA (just down the road from Tyndall) a couple
of weeks ago (vacation to get out of the cold) and saw a couple of F-22's
flying around over the Gulf of Mexico. Those babies "howl" when they fly.

Also saw a Tyndall AF pilot being interviewed on the local Destin news
concerning their brand spanking new F-22's.......can't remember his exact
words, but he was grinning ear to ear and said something to the effect that he
was flying the greatest fighter in existence.

Also visited the AF armament museum there. Ed R. might like to see the F-104
they have there. The thing looks like it just came off the assembly line.
Dave

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> >
> > Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
> at
> > low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
> > Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
> > alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
> even
> > worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
> > attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
> > weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
> cue
> > a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
> carrying
> > heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
> > persist in the interdiction area_is_.
>
> Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
> in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
> (a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package
is
> not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
> Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
> during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
> of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
> situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF
deep
> attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
> support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
> concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
> single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
> very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

You kinda miss the point. Comanche's reason for existence was to incorporate
LO into an Army platform. Otherwise, continued development of OH-58s would
have delivered the needed functions sooner and cheaper. As an ancillary
issue, the Army dragged out the development 'way too long. My company's part
of Comanche was designed twice because of parts obsolescence. If Comanche
were in the middle of production, then likely, the lessons from Iraq-2 would
have been incorporated into operations. As it is, the program gets canned.

As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the
Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into
the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If you
can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

>
> Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
> R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
> Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I or
anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads at
the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although
why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for UAVs.
They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station
for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The
ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in coverage
over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits
from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and that's
hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that in
light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program replans,
to cut its losses.

There's something systematically wrong with the way we develop aircraft.
Neither Comanche nor F-22 development should have taken as long as it has.
One of the trolls was asking for delays in F-22 production until a "complete
and independent evaluation" can be done, whatever that is. For a variety of
reasons, we can't seem to get a combat aircraft into the hands of troops in
anything like a reasonable time. During the fifties and sixties we developed
aircraft, got the -A LRIP model into the hands of troops, incorporated the
fixes for problems identified by the users in the -C model and then went
into volume production. Now, no one is willing to stick their weenie out and
the "development" stretches endlessly.

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" wrote in message
> > >
> > > Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when
operating
> > at
> > > low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
> > > Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as
the
> > > alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
> > even
> > > worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
> > > attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost
unmanned
> > > weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources
to
> > cue
> > > a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
> > carrying
> > > heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
> > > persist in the interdiction area_is_.
> >
> > Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack
helos
> > in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume)
when
> > (a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support
package
> is
> > not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around
you?
> > Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the
helo
> > during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those
kind
> > of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
> > situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF
> deep
> > attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
> > support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
> > concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
> > single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances,
and
> > very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.
>
> You kinda miss the point. Comanche's reason for existence was to
incorporate
> LO into an Army platform.

No, its reason for existance was to provide a state of the art
reconnaissance and light attack capability that incorporated low
observability (not in just the radar spectrum, either) features. There is a
difference--the goal was not to get LO into an Army system so much as it was
to get a system that incorporated the LO.

Otherwise, continued development of OH-58s would
> have delivered the needed functions sooner and cheaper.

But without the capabilities of the Commanche. The 58 series is not capable
of continual upgrade; hell, the D model is already grossly different from
the original A model, and probably about maxed out in terms of economical
upgrade. You can only cram so much poop in a bag that size and of that
particular configuration.

As an ancillary
> issue, the Army dragged out the development 'way too long. My company's
part
> of Comanche was designed twice because of parts obsolescence. If Comanche
> were in the middle of production, then likely, the lessons from Iraq-2
would
> have been incorporated into operations. As it is, the program gets canned.

Hey, I *like* the decision to can it, and it was drug out too long, was a
bit too ambitious, its radar LO design was of questionable value in view of
its trade-offs, and it was too darned expensive. But NONE of that bears upon
your claim that the manned attack helo is allegedly a thing of the past, now
does it?

>
> As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that the
> Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire into
> the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If
you
> can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.

I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that
it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas where
ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and
egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube arty
fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70
klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those submunitions
going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of those
that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know.
But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
supportable postion IMO.

>
> >
> > Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary
UCAV
> > R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
> > Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.
>
> Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that I
or
> anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those blockheads
at
> the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet. Although
> why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.

Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain
masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?

>
> The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
UAVs.
> They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
> unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on station
> for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed. The
> ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
> over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
> overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets benefits
> from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
that's
> hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided that
in
> light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
> to cut its losses.

You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get in
closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of
those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still
have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing UAV's
can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned around,
take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again.
Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the fight,
and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
your FARP's is an advantage.

>
> There's something systematically wrong with the way we develop aircraft.
> Neither Comanche nor F-22 development should have taken as long as it has.

I'd agree with that.

> One of the trolls was asking for delays in F-22 production until a
"complete
> and independent evaluation" can be done, whatever that is. For a variety
of
> reasons, we can't seem to get a combat aircraft into the hands of troops
in
> anything like a reasonable time. During the fifties and sixties we
developed
> aircraft, got the -A LRIP model into the hands of troops, incorporated the
> fixes for problems identified by the users in the -C model and then went
> into volume production. Now, no one is willing to stick their weenie out
and
> the "development" stretches endlessly.

Which is why spiral development is all the rage these days. But when they do
use that approach, they have some congressional weenie sitting on the Hill
start whining about the lack of complete testing, and risk, etc.

Brooks

>
>
>
>

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
for UAVs.
> They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
an
> unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
> for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
needed. The
> ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
coverage
> over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
platform
> overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
> from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
and that's
> hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
that in
> light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
replans,
> to cut its losses.

I've read the above three times, and I still can't see where UAVs get
credit for saving our side's human lives. Heli pilots fully
expendable??

"Kevin Brooks" > wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote
> >

> >
> > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that
the
> > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
into
> > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did. If
> you
> > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
>
> I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources that
> it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
where
> ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress and
> egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
arty
> fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around 70
> klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
submunitions
> going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
those
> that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
> expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never know.
> But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
> circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
> determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> supportable postion IMO.
>

Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use this
much support for ingress and egress? You're taking it as a given that AHs
are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than any
other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but
in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.

If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's not
clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.

> >
> > >
> > > Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary
> UCAV
> > > R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support
the
> > > Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.
> >
> > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion that
I
> or
> > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
blockheads
> at
> > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
Although
> > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
>
> Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use terrain
> masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?

The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to
short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
analysis space to consider other alternatives.

>
> >
> > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
> UAVs.
> > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of an
> > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
station
> > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed.
The
> > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> coverage
> > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a platform
> > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
benefits
> > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
> that's
> > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
that
> in
> > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> replans,
> > to cut its losses.
>
> You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also get
in
> closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all of
> those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't still
> have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
UAV's
> can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
> refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
around,
> take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
> munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over again.
> Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
fight,
> and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
> your FARP's is an advantage.

AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from them
(and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment,
the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops* he
disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than a
heavy loadout on a few platforms.

Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a
real question whether they're the best way to do it. A platform that flies
in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet. In any case,
you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms. No
single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
future. To do so would be stupid.

There are two missions here.

The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the
take will be available to all the forces.

The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd. An AH
integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data
network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right
place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way, that's
one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's still
another.

One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the war
you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
. ..

> This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the
> Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
> advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and the
arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning radar
that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and
JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane
was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate
things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's dropping
GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles.

In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to an
end.

--
Raymond Chuang
Sacramento, CA USA

"Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
...
>
> "Kevin Brooks" > wrote
> >
> > "Paul F Austin" > wrote
> > >
>
> > >
> > > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was that
> the
> > > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
> into
> > > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did.
If
> > you
> > > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
> >
> > I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources
that
> > it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
> where
> > ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress
and
> > egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
> arty
> > fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to around
70
> > klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> > mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
> submunitions
> > going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
> those
> > that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
> > expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> > effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never
know.
> > But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set of
> > circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor in
> > determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> > supportable postion IMO.
> >
>
> Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use
this
> much support for ingress and egress?

You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and
capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems?

You're taking it as a given that AHs
> are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than
any
> other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle but
> in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.

Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and waiting).
I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I?

>
> If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's
not
> clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.

They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units
supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on their
use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program
as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF
condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile?

>
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a
rotary
> > UCAV
> > > > R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support
> the
> > > > Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some
cases.
> > >
> > > Of course it's not. It's not even "my idea". I'm under no illusion
that
> I
> > or
> > > anyone on this forum will "think up" a new paradigm that those
> blockheads
> > at
> > > the Pentagon, yadayada... Real analysis doesn't happen on Usenet.
> Although
> > > why the Army restricts its thinking to rotorcraft is a good question.
> >
> > Kind of hard to have a CTOL airframe use a FARP, isn't it? Or use
terrain
> > masking effectively while it loiters and peeks, or loiters and shoots?
>
> The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
> taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
> Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded to
> short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
> analysis space to consider other alternatives.

Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long preparation.
The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they
like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to
continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target
heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not
going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example. Ever
wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its
AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing
situation's requirements.

>
> >
> > >
> > > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages for
> > UAVs.
> > > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
an
> > > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> station
> > > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when needed.
> The
> > > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> > coverage
> > > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
platform
> > > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> benefits
> > > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off and
> > that's
> > > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
> that
> > in
> > > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> > replans,
> > > to cut its losses.
> >
> > You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> > normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also
get
> in
> > closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role, all
of
> > those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> > capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't
still
> > have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
> UAV's
> > can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
> > refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
> around,
> > take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
> > munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> > Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over
again.
> > Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
> fight,
> > and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can use
> > your FARP's is an advantage.
>
> AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from
them
> (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current environment,
> the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
> detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or *oops*
he
> disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather than
a
> heavy loadout on a few platforms.

No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You
also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor
groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of
talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still need
those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a
role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in
the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission
during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the attack
helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist in
terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical
conclusion.

>
> Snooping and pooping is a traditional role that OHs have filled. There's a
> real question whether they're the best way to do it.

In all circumstances? No they would not be. Are you ready to replace their
capabilities with UAV's *right now*? No (a glance at the Army's UAV programs
and history will prove that). Will we be ready to completely do so in five
years? I seriously doubt it. Ten years? I still doubt that we will be ready
to fully hand off the scouting role to unmanned platforms at that point,
unless we really experienced a change in luck in terms of tactical UAV
success. So what do use during that time period until your "uber UAV's" are
ready and fully fielded?

A platform that flies
> in the Predator envelope (about 10Kfeet) misses nothing from a sensor
> standpoint that could be gained by flying at a hundred feet.

Really? You can ensure that the same detail is acheived? I doubt that.

In any case,
> you're ignoring the value of fused sensor data from multiple platforms.

Which you think we have already conquered--but we have not. We are working
towards it, and guess what--one of those contributing platforms is, and will
be, the manned scout helo.

No
> single scout is_ever_going to operate outside the data network in the
> future. To do so would be stupid.

Who ssaid it would?

>
> There are two missions here.
>
> The first is an ISR mission that's going to be served by a network of
> sensors and platforms. Some of the platforms will be under control of
> brigade and lower, some will be controlled by higher echelons but_all_the
> take will be available to all the forces.

You are dreaming here. We currently have the ASIC reside at *division*
level. Will we improve the picture at the BCT and even BN TF levels? No
doubt we will. But do we want some poor company team commander, or platoon
leader, or for that matter the BN TF staff, to have to wade through the
plethora of data that does NOT impact their mission needs? Nope. Do you want
to crap out the bandwidth with the transfer of data that is not needed by
lower echelon units? Nope again. And how does any of this imply that the
manned helo does not have a role today, or for that matter during the
foreseeable future? It doesn't.

>
> The second mission is ordnance delivery. AHs can do that although they
> compete with fixed wing assets as well as the artillery crowd.

Used properly they *complement* those systems, just as those systems
complement its use; "compete" is the wrong term of use.

An AH
> integrates sensors and ordnance and it's not clear to me, given that data
> network, where the right place in the number of platforms/loadout per
> platform/sensors per platform/endurance per platform space is the right
> place to be. If you're dealing with a Sea O' Tanks heading your way,
that's
> one thing. If you're looking to pot a target speeding from one hide to
> another, that's another thing. If you're looking for a rascal on a
> motorcycle that just launched an RPG at the local headquarters, that's
still
> another.
>
> One abiding fault of armies is the desire to equip yourself to fight the
war
> you_want_to fight. That's a cardinal error.

Another cardinal error is trying to take the results of the last conflict
(in this case of the 11th AVN deep attack a singular battle at that) and
apply them with undue rigor to all future conflicts.

Brooks

>
>

"Felger Carbon" > wrote in message
nk.net...
> "Paul F Austin" > wrote in message
> ...
> >
> > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
> for UAVs.
> > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
> an
> > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> station
> > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
> needed. The
> > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> coverage
> > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
> platform
> > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> benefits
> > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
> and that's
> > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
> that in
> > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> replans,
> > to cut its losses.
>
> I've read the above three times, and I still can't see where UAVs get
> credit for saving our side's human lives. Heli pilots fully
> expendable??

I don't think I said that. UAVs have an advantage over manned platforms for
extremely hazardous missions like SEAD because of the reduced risk to crews
but another advantage is the option of extremely long mission times because
the "crew" can change without bringing the aircraft back to base. Manned
aircraft do put aircrew at risk but you have the advantage of a human being
on the spot. One hump UCAVs will have to get over is the reluctance that
"higher" has in turning an autonomous weapon loose with reduced human
supervision. Certainly at first, the "trigger" will remain firmly in human
hands. Probably the_last_"trigger" to be turned over to robotic killers will
be air-to-air weapons, since the pilots' union will be extremely reluctant
to share the sky with them.

"Raymond Chuang" wrote
> "Paul F Austin" wrote
>
> > This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
> the
> > Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
> > advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's
weapon.
>
> There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and
the
> arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning
radar
> that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi
> Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and
> JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane
> was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate
> things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's
dropping
> GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles.

No single sensor sees all and knows all. For example, JSTARS is extremely
limited in mountainous terrain (because of limited sight lines). Likewise,
very high fliers like U-2 and G-Hawk have trouble with some sensors and some
angles. It takes (and we're deploying) a wide range of sensorcraft that
complement each other. Some of the key ones (U-2, G-Hawk, Rivet Joint and
JSTARs) are extremely over-committed right now.

>
> In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to
an
> end.

That may be true in the future, which isn't here yet.

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
>
> "Paul F Austin" wrote
> >
> > "Kevin Brooks" wrote
> > >
> > > "Paul F Austin" wrote
> > > >
> >
> > > >
> > > > As for the lack of SEAD, my impression (and that's all it is) was
that
> > the
> > > > Iraqis had everyone with a weapon that could elevate far enough fire
> > into
> > > > the night once the alarm was given, much the way the Vietnamese did.
> If
> > > you
> > > > can suppress_that_then you don't need to AHs in the first place.
> > >
> > > I don't think you fully understand the SEAD effort, and the resources
> that
> > > it can include, that normally supports such an operation. Likely areas
> > where
> > > ground fire or weapons systems would be encountered during the ingress
> and
> > > egress can be suppressed (actually saturated) by a combination of tube
> > arty
> > > fires, MLRS (which is probably the best single SEAD asset out to
around
> 70
> > > klicks), and even ATACMS (which can go to around 300 klicks) if the
> > > mission/threat requires them. Any idea what the effect of those
> > submunitions
> > > going off around your "everybody shoot up" crowd would be? How many of
> > those
> > > that just *witness* that kind of firestorm are subsequently willing to
> > > expose themselves if they *do* get a shot? Would it have been highly
> > > effective if it had been included in this attack? Maybe--we'll never
> know.
> > > But the idea that the results of a single mission flown under one set
of
> > > circumstances and without SEAD support should be the decisive factor
in
> > > determining the feasibility of attack helo operations is not a very
> > > supportable postion IMO.
> > >
> >
> > Kevin, why fly the AH strike in the first place if you're going to use
> this
> > much support for ingress and egress?
>
> You really have no idea as to the difference in terminal effects and
> capabilities between indirect dire systems and direct fire systems?

You're right about that. I'm a swivel chair hussar with no practical
knowledge of which weapons are appropriate for which particular mission. And
if it makes you feel better, I don't think all the AHs should be thrown on
the junk heap. I'm a conservative after all.

>
> You're taking it as a given that AHs
> > are more efficient at delivering ordnance to some class of targets than
> any
> > other alternative. That may be true against armor in a maneuver battle
but
> > in Iraq-2, that wasn't the target set.
>
> Actually, it sometimes was (they did not always remain dug in and
waiting).
> I did not say anything about "any other alternative", now did I?
>
> >
> > If we were arming for the Fulda Gap, then AHs make a lot of sense. It's
> not
> > clear to me that it's true for the battles we fight these days.
>
> They guys fighting in Anaconda like their support. As did the USMC units
> supported by their AH-1W's (interesting account in last month's AFM on
their
> use in OIF). Note that the USMC is also still pursuing their AH-1Z program
> as fast as they can. So where do you get this strange idea that OIF
> condemned the attack helo concept to the trashpile?

I don't and I didn't focus particularly on the 11th's engagement. What I
paid more attention to was the air campaign over Afghanistan with
the_extremely_long mission times required. Yep, the guys on the ground in
the Anaconda op needed a great deal of CAS. I just want to open the box a
bit on how to deliver those fires, considering what would have happened if
the SF teams had needed urgent support before the Marines opened up shop at
Camp Rhino.

> >
> > The object is warheads on foreheads. The FARP/short flight time ordnance
> > taxi is one model for doing that. A cloud of UCAVs in another. A Giant
> > Bombtruck In the Sky is still another. Because the Army has been wedded
to
> > short range, low endurance platforms is no reason not to open up the
> > analysis space to consider other alternatives.
>
> Hint--long endurance usually meand long transit time, and long
preparation.

Neither one is necessarily true. Because e.g. G-Hawk-can-fly
intercontinental missions, the temptation on the part of mission planners is
to use the endurance that way. The same endurance can result in multi-day
time on station using a regional base.

> The immediate CAS/AI situation may not allow for that. Which is why they
> like that whole FARP concept--need more 2.75 inch FFAR's and 30mm to
> continue that suppression mission that just moved to the top of the target
> heap? The FARP has them close by--that UAV orbiting with its BAT's is not
> going to do you a lot of good in that scenario. Just a simple example.
Ever
> wonder why the USMC also values the attack helo, and for that matter its
> AV-8B's? There is a lot to be said for quick response to a changing
> situation's requirements.

The Marines love their organic air because of institutional memory that goes
back to Guadalcanal, when the Navy sailed away, leaving the Marines holding
the bag (and I'm an ex-sailor). I understand the virtues of organic assets.
But. The Army's institutional experience with CAS systems is strongly
colored by the Key West Agreement and the limitations that put on the kinds
of aircraft the Army was allowed to operate. Helos were allowed so the Army
got expert in helicopters. I have a submariners's prejudices that helos are
unnatural contrivances.

Yes, quick response is the key and since Comanche is dead (and we both agree
that was the right decision), now is the time to determine the best way to
generate responsive CAS. My prejudices say that the CAS assets should be
organic to the Army but that's Unjoint.

> > > >
> > > > The last two years have clearly illustrated some major advantages
for
> > > UAVs.
> > > > They can't do everything by any means but the "natural advantage" of
> an
> > > > unmanned platform lies in great persistence, being able to stay on
> > station
> > > > for very long times so that the platform is there exactly when
needed.
> > The
> > > > ISR community has found that there are step-change improvements in
> > > coverage
> > > > over satellites and manned aircraft that derive from keeping a
> platform
> > > > overhead all day long. Likewise, hitting fleeting, moving targets
> > benefits
> > > > from having a launcher available_right now_, not five minutes off
and
> > > that's
> > > > hard to do with manned platforms and_may_be easier with UCAVs. It's
> > > > a_may_because the analysis is in progress but apparently OSD decided
> > that
> > > in
> > > > light of bad management, bad programmatic news and repeated program
> > > replans,
> > > > to cut its losses.
> > >
> > > You are mixing your systems up a bit. Long duration ISR missions are
> > > normally flown at altitude; but the Army needs a system that can also
> get
> > in
> > > closer (lower) for finite detail. When you switch to the UCAV role,
all
> of
> > > those current long duration UAV's have a pretty miserly weapons load
> > > capability--they are of little value rotating overhead if they don't
> still
> > > have munitions capable of doing the various jobs required. Fixed wing
> > UAV's
> > > can't hit a FARP and be back into the fight quickly after rearming and
> > > refueling--they have to mosey on back to the rear, land, get turned
> > around,
> > > take back off and mosey on back up to the battle area, dispense their
> > > munitions (which from what I have seen so far is a load of maybe two
> > > Hellfires, or four BAT's), after which they have to do it all over
> again.
> > > Which tells me that the larger attack helos still have a role in the
> > fight,
> > > and if you are planning to go the UCAV route, a VTOL system that can
use
> > > your FARP's is an advantage.
> >
> > AHs may have their place. The Israelis certainly get a lot of use from
> them
> > (and so do the Iranians from what I've read). In the current
environment,
> > the target set that needs servicing is the "30 second" target, between
> > detection and identification and either a warhead on a forehead or
*oops*
> he
> > disappeared. That kind of target requires ubiquitous platforms rather
than
> a
> > heavy loadout on a few platforms.
>
> No, that is just ONE of the target types that need we have to address. You
> also need to be able to address that immediate CAS request from the poor
> groundpounder who is sitting there with his SINCGARS and incapable of
> talking to the UAV operator sitting a hundred klicks back--so you still
need
> those manned CAS assets, to include the attack helos. Do the UCAV's have a
> role? Of course they do, and in all likelihood it will continue to grow in
> the future. But taking the single example of the 11th AVN deep mission
> during OIF and extrapolating a result of "no role or mission for the
attack
> helo in the modern fight" in favor of the UCAV (which does not yet exist
in
> terms of the capabilites you are requiring of them) is not a logical
> conclusion.

If the PBI can't talk to the UAV operator a hundred klicks back, he likely
can't talk to the orbiting CAS either. You miss a key point. We do CAS very
well now. We-don't- do the 30 second sensor